Monthly Archives: May 2016

Will Trucking Case Drive New Federal Arbitration Act Case to the Supreme Court?

Arbitration, Class Waiver, Federal Preemption, Supreme Court, ,

** Gas Company Looks for Post-Iskanian Certiorari After California Appeals Court Invalidates Arbitration and Class Waiver Provision in its Wage and Hour case with its Truck Drivers **            

By: Brent E. Johnson

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   California courts are known for their distaste for arbitration provisions – and for butting heads with the Supreme Court who has (on a number of occasions now) made clear that that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) (9 U.S.C. § 1) preempts California judicial rulings regarding the unconscionability of class arbitration waivers.  See e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).  The Supreme Court may get another chance to make the point, as courts in California continue with a “where there is a will – there is a way” approach to invalidating arbitration contracts.  See discussion, James v. Conceptus, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1036-37 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (concluding that, even after Concepcion, California courts continue to find arbitration forum-selection clauses unenforceable under far more stringent tests than other states).  One of the latest defendants to have their arbitration provision deemed unenforceable is Air Liquide in Garrido v. Air Liquide Indus. U.S. LP, 194 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).  However, Air Liquide has not taken it lying down – on May 3, 2016, it filed a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court. Air Liquide Indus. U.S. LP v. Garrido, No. 15-1336, 2016 WL 2605541 (U.S.) (“Writ”).

A quick bit of history for context on the Garrido Court of Appeal decision.  Recall in Gentry v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 4th 443 (Cal. 2007), the California Supreme Court held that a class-action waiver in an employment contract was unenforceable when the waiver would prevent employees from vindicating their rights.  The Gentry court concluded that even though individual arbitration could be a tool to enforce legal rights, in the context of the employment relationship – if each individual recovery would be modest, if an individual might be retaliated against if bringing a suit individually (rather than by merely joining a class) and if there are other real world obstacles in going it alone – then the provision would be invalid.  The practical effect of these Gentry factors made it highly unlikely that an employer arbitration provision would survive.  However, Gentry was overruled by Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, 327 P.3d 129 (Cal. 2014) (applying the then new rule from Concepcion).  The finding of Iskanian was that any California law that invalidated an arbitration provision was contrary to the FAA and therefore preempted.

However, in Garrido, the Court of Appeals deftly side-stepped Iskanian.  First, it determined that the FAA did not even apply to the case at hand.  194 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 302. Citing Section 1 of the FAA, which states that the FAA does not cover “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,” the California Court of Appeals held that “transportation workers” fell within this exception.  (Citing Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (2001) 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001)).  More specifically, the Garrido court held that the FAA carve-out did not apply to interstate truck drivers. 194 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 303.  And second, the Court of Appeals held that because the basis of the Iskanian decision was its nexus to the FAA – with that connection severed – Gentry not Iskanian governed. 194 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 304.  Finally (and not surprisingly), after applying the factor test from Gentry, the court held that the arbitration provision failed.

Air Liquide’s certiorari writ notes that the Court of Appeal’s severing of the relevant employment contract from the FAA was improper – foremost because the contract itself says that the FAA applies.  Air Liquide’s briefing notes that “the application of the Section 1 exemption directly contradicted the parties’ clear and expressly-stated intent to apply the FAA to their dispute. The Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the parties somehow intended to apply an exemption to the FAA to vitiate the very choice of law provision that they entered into, when in fact their intention was directly opposite, defied reason.” Writ at 5 – 6.  Air Liquide also criticizes the Court of Appeals decision for applying the “transport worker” exception outside of the trucking industry to it – a gas company – that just happens to transport its material from time to time.  Writ at 18 – 19.

This latter point raises an important issue that will apply to all companies who move their own products around the country – are their employees “transport workers”?  The more interesting and broader question, however, arises if Air Liquide fails on that question:  Can parties force the FAA to apply where it otherwise has no force?  Does an agreement that says the FAA “governs” carry with it those circumstances where it otherwise wouldn’t (because the FAA exempts it)? Interesting questions . . . and again – as we have blogged in the past – one that will be a test of the legacy of the arbitration jurisprudence of which the late Justice Scalia was the chief architect.

Ice Ice (Baby)

Consumer Class Action, Food, , ,

** Purported Class Action Attempts to Sink Starbucks with claims over allegedly misleadingly frozen water **                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        

By: Brent E. Johnson                                                                                                                                                                                         

danger thin ice - warning sign by a lake

Last week, a disgruntled Starbucks patron in Chicago filed a putative class action against the coffee icon in the Northern District of Illinois claiming that consumers like her have been defrauded over the past ten years by big plastic cups of ice.  Pincus v. Starbucks Corporation, 1:16-cv-04705 (N.D. Ill. April 27, 2016) (Dkt. No. 1).  Granted, all of the drinks that are part of the lawsuit are called “Iced Something-Or-Other,” but according to the Plaintiff that doesn’t justify Starbucks putting ice in the beverages.  Okay, that’s overstating it a bit.

The lawsuit hinges on Starbucks’ use of the acronym for fluid ounce (“fl. oz.”) on its menus and in other advertising.  Plaintiff contends that “fl. oz.” means just that – an ounce of fluid – and the actual fluid ounces in Starbucks iced drinks are less than those claimed in its advertising.  It is only by putting pre-measured scoops of ice in the drinks that the nefarious Starbucks baristas are able to completely fill those ubiquitous transparent cups.  Starbucks, of course, is behind the whole scheme supplying the baristas with beverage cups with fill-lines printed on them (product/water or lemonade/ice) as well as different size ice scoopers (Tall/Grande/Venti).  Plaintiff claims that she, and millions of other Starbucks aficionados across the United States, relied on the Company’s representations about the number of fluid ounces in their drinks and “Plaintiff would not have paid as much, if anything for the Cold Drinks had she known that it [sic] contained less, and in many cases, nearly half as many, fluid ounces than claimed by Starbucks.”

“Ounce” is Middle English from the Anglo-French “unce” and is a unit of mass equal to 1/16 of an avoirdupois pound and 1/12 of the troy pound favored by precious metal dealers.  More importantly, an ounce is 0.666682 of a jigger of Jim Beam.  Accordingly, any class certified in this case must certainly exclude gold investors and may need to be limited to hard core drinkers who know what an ounce looks (and feels) like.  But while the public may have some difficulty visually identifying an ounce, they certainly know the difference between a Grande and a Venti, which is, after all, what they’re buying.

Plaintiff’s class definition is “[a]ll persons in the United States of America who purchased one or more of Defendant’s Cold Drinks at any time between April 27, 2006 and the present.”  “Cold Drinks”  include, but are not limited to, “iced coffee, shaken iced tea, shaken iced tea lemonade, Refreshers®, and Fizzio™ handcrafted sodas” (which, as an aside, are sadly not available at all Starbucks locations – but for those in the right locale, our pro tip is the Golden Ginger Ale).  Although both cold and a drink, the Frappuccino® is not included.  And that’s the whole problem with this case, isn’t it?

The Frappuccino® contains plenty of ice.  But because the ice is blended with the flavored ingredients, it apparently qualifies as a liquid even though it’s really tiny shards of ice.  Which raises the questions:  If the ice melts in a Starbucks Iced Coffee before the purchaser finishes drinking it, is the purchaser getting the advertised number of fluid ounces?  What if the purchaser is an ice chomper?  Plaintiff’s complaint shrewdly anticipates these defenses.  First, Starbucks uses “large pieces of ice” that “take up more space and thus when melted, will yield fewer measured ‘fluid’ ounces of coffee or tea . . . .”  (Starbucks is skimping on the water!)  More broadly, Plaintiff declares that “a reasonable consumer does not wait for the ice in a Cold Drink to melt before consuming the Cold Drink.”  This point, of course, will require survey evidence to establish — or perhaps the class can be limited to purchasers of Starbucks Cold Beverages who are not sippers or chompers.  (Ascertainability might be a problem here.)

Starbucks suffers from its transparency (which is the opposite of the problem it faced in a now dismissed slack fill case against it filed in New York).  Anyone who purchases an iced beverage for the first time – particularly a shaken iced tea, a Refresher® or a Fizzio™  – is startled when the barista pours such a small amount of the flavored stuff in the bottom of one of those big plastic cups and then tops it off with water (or lemonade) and finally, a huge mound of ice.  A Diet Coke from the McDonald’s drive-thru window retains its mystery.  How much syrup?  How much ice?  But for those who love Starbucks, the beverages are consistently great – a treat to be savored slowly . . . while the triple-filtered ice melts.