class settlement

A Poker Lesson From The Pom Wonderful v. Coca-Cola Co. Cases



** Coca Cola Prevails in false Advertising Case Bought By Pom Wonderful – Trying to Protect its Pomegranate Juice Market – While at the Same Time Settling Class Actions **                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            

Pom Wonderful lost its 7 1/2 year battle against Coca-Cola this week after a nine person jury in California found that Coke was not misleading consumers with its Minute Maid division’s “Pomegranate Blueberry Flavored Blend of 5 Juices” which contained only a half-percent of pomegranate and blueberry juice.  Pom Wonderful LLC v. The Coco-Cola Co., No. cv-08-06239-SJO (MJWX) (C.D. Cal. March 21, 2016) (Dkt. 732). Pom had argued that the product’s labeling, which included pictures of all five fruits with the pomegranate dominating (although the apple was pretty darn big too) and the fact that “Flavored Blend of 5 Juices” was in smaller print below “Pomegranate Blueberry” was intended to “hoodwink” consumers into believe that pomegranate and blueberry juices were significant components of the product.  In addition, Pom pointed to the color of Minute Maid’s juice in its clear plastic bottles, which resembled pomegranate juice (i.e., red).  Pom’s attorneys told the jury that Coke leached off of the hard work and money that Pom had invested in growing the pomegranate juice market by creating a cheap juice that Pom’s customers would be tricked into buying due to the cost differential and the belief that they were getting the healthy benefits of pomegranate juice.  Pom sought $77.6 million in lost profits.

Coke’s principal defense was simple — it’s label was accurate and complied with FDA guidelines.  However, it is worth noting that Coke recently settled – subject to preliminary and final court approval — a putative consumer class action, Niloofar Saeidian v. The Coca Cola Company, Case No. 09-cv-06309, which was filed in the Central District of California approximately one year after Pom filed its lawsuit and which made the same deceptive labeling allegations on behalf of a nation-wide class of consumers who purchased the juice.  Interestingly, both the Pom and Saeidian cases are before Judge S. James Otero.  The proposed class action settlement provides for full refunds to class members with proof of purchase (uncapped) and up to two vouchers for replacement products in Coke’s Minute Maid, Simply, Smartwater, Vitaminwater, Vitaminwater Zero, and Honest Tea brands (capped at 200,000 on a “first come, first served” basis).  Coke also agreed to pay the administrative costs of the settlement (est. $400,000), attorney fees and costs not to exceed $700,000, a $5,000 incentive payment to Mr. Saeidian, and to donate $300,000 in product to Feeding America.  Finally, during the pendency of the class action (and the Pom case for that matter), Coke discontinued Minute Maid’s Enhanced Pomegranate Blueberry Flavored Blend of 5 Juices and represented in the settlement that it has no plans to reintroduce it.  Niloofar Saeidian v. The Coca Cola Company, No. 09-cv-06309, (C.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2016) (Dkt. 192).

Does Coke regret settling the class action lawsuit less than a month before its triumph in Pom?  The difference between the results highlights the stark differences between consumer class actions and Lanham Act false advertising cases.  The latter, especially those not involving negative advertising – are notoriously hard on plaintiffs.  First, surveys show that juries say they read labels – word for word – (see Persuasion Strategies National Jury Survey, 2015).  It thus an uphill battle to convince them they have been misled by a label.  Second, if a company dishes it out, it will almost surely have to take it (nobody’s ads are perfect after-all). In Pom, Pom Wonderful’s claim of misleading labeling was met by Coke asserting “unclean hands” — pointing the jury to an 2012 administrative law judge’s decision in a case brought by the FTC against Pom that Pom made unsubstantiated claims that its juice treated, prevented or reduced the risk of heart disease, prostate cancer, and erectile dysfunction (upheld by POM Wonderful, LLC v. F.T.C., 777 F.3d 478 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).  This is likely a second critical underestimate of jurors’ typical behavior that worked against Pom. Most jurors react predictably to a party’s perceived hypocrisy. Third, most advertisements aren’t blatantly (legal term: “ literally”)  false so the question of whether an ad or label is materially deceptive comes into play.  Experts are hired to present bone dry surveys of consumer behavior, markets and perceptions of the offending ad that are subject to methodology challenges and sometimes clash with jurors’ own perceptions:  “Why do we need an expert? Everybody knows what that means?”  These experts’ opinions even conflict with the company’s own beliefs from time to time.  Indeed, Coke’s counsel’s closing argument mocked Pom’s assertion that Minute Maid’s juice stole customers from Pom by quoting from some early “creative briefs” prepared by Pom’s marketing department that Pom’s target audience for certain ads was “health-conscious hypochondriacs,” juxtaposing that audience with Minute Maid’s target market — regular old families.  And fourth, even if a corporate plaintiff successfully navigates these tough proof issues, it is left with the daunting task of proving that it suffered actual injury from its competitor’s ad and the amount of that injury in dollars – no easy task in multi-competitor markets that suffer the slings and arrows of shifting consumer tastes, new market entrants, the next “new thing,” and the fluctuation of the economy as a whole.  Frequently, defense counsel in Lanham Act cases are willing to just poke holes in plaintiffs’ experts’ damage analyses through cross-examination and possibly their own experts’ critiques without proffering alternative damage calculations on the theory that offering alternative numbers is a tacit admission of liability and creates a floor.  Coke eschewed this approach and called an expert who testified that, even accepting some of Pom’s forensic accountant’s premises, Pom’s damages would only be between $886,000 and $9.8 million – not $77.6 million (see also this post on the strategy for damages anchors).  In the end, that tactical decision didn’t matter.  In less than a day of deliberations, the jury determined that Coke’s blended juice did not mislead consumers about the amount of pomegranate juice in the bottle.  Pom Wonderful LLC v. The Coco-Cola Co., No. cv-08-06239-SJO (MJWX) (C.D. Cal. March 21, 2016) (Dkt. 732).

One can assume that Pom went into this Lanham Act lawsuit against Coke with eyes wide open.  Clearly Pom is sincere in its view that its hard work and research funding created the explosive growth in consumer demand for pomegranate juice and its market should not be hijacked by impostors.  Pom had previously been to trial against Ocean Spray and Welch’s making similar Lanham Act claims to the ones asserted against Coke.  In the Ocean Spray case, a two-week trial in the Central District of California at the end of 2011 resulted in a jury verdict that Ocean Spray did not deceptively advertise its “100% Juice Cranberry and Pomegranate” juice after two hours of deliberation.   Pom Wonderful LLC v. Ocean’s Spray Inc., No. 2:09-cv-00565-DDP-R2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2011) (Dkt. 552). The Welch’s case proved a pyrrhic victory for Pom – the Central District of California jury found in 2010 that Welch’s labeling of its juice as “100% Juice White Grape Pomegranate” was literally true but nevertheless deceptive yet concluded that Pom was unable to prove any injury.  Interestingly, Welch’s – like Coke – settled two consolidated consumer class action lawsuits making the same claims as Pom five months after its victory over Pom. Pom Wonderful LLC v. Welch Foods Inc., No. 2:09-cv-00567-AHM-AGR (C.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2010) (Dkt. 374).

In the end, the problem with Pom’s Lanham Act lawsuits – like many such cases – may be the plaintiff.  Jurors are asked to find that the defendant deceived consumers, but then give the money to a competitor – not a particularly satisfying result.  This is obviously not a problem in consumer class actions.  In a Lanham Act case, if the advertising is negative and directly pointed at the competitor or if the advertisement is particularly naughty – for example, Blue Buffalo’s trumpeting that its premium priced dog food contained no byproducts when the company knew that it did (lesson: don’t mess with man’s best friend) – a jury will likely find liability and damages.  But in the more common “literally true but deceptive” case, Lanham claims are a hard sell.  In the triad of Pom cases, the only one in which actual consumers testified as to deception was Welch’s, which might have had something to do with the jury’s finding of deception.                                                                                                                                                                                                             

Share this:

No New Year Cheer For “Meaningless” Class Settlements

** Second Circuit Affirms Denial of Class Certification in Low Ball Settlement of New York Fair Debt Collection Suit **                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

A recent Second Circuit decision highlights the thorny issues involved in a “low dollar” class settlement.  In Gallego v. Northland Group Inc. No. 15-1666-CV (2d Cir. Feb. 22, 2016), Gallego, along with about 100,000 New York residents, received a rather perky dunning letter from defendant collection agency Northland in January 2014 declaring, “IT’S A NEW YEAR WITH NEW OPPORTUNITIES!” and inviting Gallego to settle his debt with a department store credit card company.  Rather than heralding the new year by settling the claim, Gallego rang it in by bringing a putative class action lawsuit against Northland under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”).  The substance of the claim was dubious – attempting to bootstrap a technical violation of the New York City Administrative Code (not providing the name of an individual to contact) into a false representation or unfair or unconscionable means under the FDCPA.

Northland, apparently calculating that it was cheaper to settle than fight, entered into a proposed settlement with Gallego.  In addition to an attorneys’ fee cap of $35,000, Northland agreed to establish a settlement fund of $17,500 – approximately 1% of the net worth liability limit under the FDCPA.  Gallego would receive a $1,000 incentive fee and the remaining $16,500 would be distributed pro rata to class members who made a claim.  The proposed settlement dissolved if there were 50 opt outs – who could then bring individual actions under the FDCPA with statutory damages of $1,000 each plus attorney fees.

The district court denied class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) superiority observing that class members would receive 16.5 cents each while, if they brought individual actions, they might each recover $1,000 statutory damages and attorney fees. Gallego v. Northland Group Inc. 102 F.Supp.3d 506 (S.D.N.Y 2015).  The court opined that the prospects of a recovery measured in pennies would likely result in “mass indifference” among most class members who would be deterred from filing individual lawsuits or joining the class.  This could result in a few class members reaping a windfall from the settlement.  “The prospects of mass indifference, a few profiteers, and a quick fee to clever lawyers is hardly the intended outcome for Rule 23 class actions.”

On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying certification.  Gallego argued that it was unlikely that all 100,000 class members would make claims so the individual class member recovery would be higher (a particularly noteworthy admission given that because Northland sent the offending letters in the first place – individual notice was practical and would likely be effective in this case) – basically agreeing with the district court that there would be “mass indifference” to the settlement.  The Court of Appeals retorted, “An expected low participation rate is hardly a selling point for a proposed classwide settlement.”  The Second Circuit went even further, determining that the district court would have been right in doubting that Gallego would “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class,” as required by Rule 23(a)(4) pointing out that the proposed settlement included a release – not only of class members’ FDCPA claims – but all “claims arising out of any of the facts, events, occurrences, acts or omissions complained of in the Lawsuit, or other related matters . . . relating to letters sent to them that are substantially similar to the letter” received by Gallego.

It is important to reiterate that the FDCPA provides for an individual right of action with statutory damages as well as attorney fees, which are often absent from general consumer protection statutes.  This made it easy for the district court to find that the class action lawsuit was not a superior method for resolving the dispute given the proposed settlement value.  Nevertheless, the district court’s “a plague on both your houses” conclusion on class certification serves up a cautionary note:  “Because I find that certifying a class would do little more than turn [Nortland’s] settlement with Mr. Gallego into a general release of liability from all similarly situated plaintiffs at minimal extra cost while furthering a cottage industry among enterprising lawyers, class certification is denied.”

Share this:

False Advertising to the Dogs

**Record Payout By Blue Buffalo in Multi District Pet Food Class Settlement sparked by Nestle Purina Competitor Law Suit** . . .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            

Competitor lawsuits give class action plaintiffs a helpful leg-up.  See Prior post.  The Blue Buffalo matter is a good case in point.  Blue Buffalo makes pet food which was advertised, amongst other things, as not containing animal by-products or grain.  According to Blue Buffalo’s main competitor Nestle Purina that advertising claim is not true.  Nestlé Purina PetCare Company v. Blue Buffalo Company Ltd., Civil Case No. 4:14-cv-008590 (E.D. Mo. May 6, 2014) Compl. ECF No. 2, see also First Amended Compl. (Nov. 13, 2014) ECF No. 104.  Nestle Purina’s claim was that its own lab testing of the Blue Buffalo’s products found – contrary to the advertising – both poultry by-products and grain.  And indeed, during discovery, Nestle Purina claims that it found smoking gun emails between Blue Buffalo’s suppliers and brokers about by-products in the supply chain (and unfortunately for Blue Buffalo the emails literally used the phrase “smoking gun”).  See 4:14-cv-00859-RWS, Doc. #. 77-1 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 10, 2014).  The inevitable consumer led class actions ensued (using the Nestle Purina claims and findings as their model)–: Fisher et al v. The Blue Buffalo Company, Ltd. et al, Case No. 14-cv-5937 (C.D. Cal.); Teperson et al v. The Blue Buffalo Company, Ltd et al, Case No. 14-cv-1682, (S.D. Cal.); Delre et al v. Blue Buffalo Co., Ltd, Case No. 14-cv-768, (D. Ct.); Renna et al v. Blue Buffalo Co., Ltd., Case No. 14-cv-833, (D. Ct.); Mackenzie et al v. The Blue Buffalo Company, Ltd., Inc., Case No. 14-cv-80634, (S.D. Fl.); Stone et al v. Blue Buffalo Company Ltd., Case No. 14-cv-520, (S.D. Ill.); Keil et al v. Blue Buffalo Company, Ltd., Case No. 14-cv-880, (E.D. Mo.); Hutchison et al v. Blue Buffalo Company, Ltd., Case No. 14-cv-1070, (E.D. Mo.); Andacky et al v. The Blue Buffalo Company, Ltd., Case No. 14-cv-2938, (E.D. N.Y.).  Blue Buffalo in turn counterclaimed against Nestle Purina asking for an injunction to stop Nestle Purina from its advertising attacking Blue Buffalo’s practices.  And when the “smoking gun” appeared, Blue Buffalo sued the third party companies who allegedly supplied it with by-product material.  The various class complaints were transferred after a Multi District Litigation Panel hearing to federal court in Missouri.  In re Blue Buffalo Co., Ltd. Marketing and Sales Practice Litigation Case No. 4:14-md-02562-RWS (E.D. Mo.).   On December 9, 2015 class settlement and class certification approval was filed.  ECF No. 159.  The court, preliminarily approved the certification and settlement a week later.  ECF No. 164.  The fairness hearing is set for May 19, 2016.  Nestle Purina is trumpeting the $32 million settlement as the “largest pet food class action settlement in history.” Interestingly, Blue Buffalo fought most of the litigation at the same time as listing its IPO.  The class action’s impact on the IPO is unclear – the shares gained 38 percent on the issue’s first full day of trading on the Nasdaq in July 2015.  That said, pursuant to the settlement Blue Buffalo will take a charge against Q4 2015 earnings of $32 million. In the third quarter, the company’s net profit totaled $27 million.

Share this:

Hitting Back at Class Settlement Objectors

**Plaintiff Class Counsel Seek Sanctions Against Alleged “Lawyer-Driven” Objections to its Becks Beer Settlement**

Plaintiff’s Class Counsel have been successfully using the threat of sanctions to ward off late game class objectors.  See prior post.  Another recent case has highlighted the issue.  In 2013 Beck’s Beer was sued under the theory that it’s packaging claims such as “originated in Germany” with “German quality” and “export bier” implied that the beer was a German import.  And certainly while that was true at one time, after 2008 the Beck’s Beer label was sold to the Belgian brewer Interbrew which later merged with American giant Anheuser Busch – and production of the beer moved to the U.S (in fact Beck’s Beer is brewed in the same facility as the synonymous American: Budweiser).  Plaintiff’s sued on allegations of false advertising and a class settlement was reached in June 2015: the settlement allowed a maximum award of $50 per household (less for those consumers without proof of purchase).  Marty v. Anheuser-Busch Companies, 1:13-cv-23656-JJO (S.D. Fl. June 18, 2015) ECF No. 149.  The class settlement was capped at $20 million and the attorneys’ fees were set at $3.5 million.  Id.  Class member Rene Muller (through his counsel Stephen Field) filed a settlement objection – claiming, generally, that the settlement terms were inflated and that attorney fees were too high.  Id. at ECF No. 161 (September 29, 2015).  The Court considered the objection, held a fairness hearing and overruled the objections.  Id. at ECF No. 171 (October 22, 2015).  It then granted final settlement approval.  Id. at ECF No. 172 (October 22, 2015).  Class counsel however were not satisfied – they took the deposition of Muller who (class counsel alleges) revealed that he generally knew nothing about the case, or the settlement, or his objection and was interested merely in a payoff (similar to a payoff he had received in a previous class action objection).  Id. at ECF No. 174 (November 12, 2015).  As such – class counsel sought sanctions against Muller’s attorney Stephen Field under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 which provides that: “[a]ny attorney . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.”  Id.  Essentially, class counsel has argued that the only rational explanation for the objectors threadbare knowledge of his objection – was that the attorney Stephen Field put him up to it – in hope of a hefty settlement.  Id.  Field has opposed the Motion for Sanctions, amongst other things, noting the inherent irony of Plaintiff’s class counsel (who seek to get paid to settle suits) asking for sanctions against him for doing inherently the same thing.  Id. at ECF No. 177 (November 30, 2015).  The matter of sanctions is currently under advisement.



Share this: