Monthly Archives: April 2016

Class Actions And Taxes in New Jersey

** “In this world nothing can be said to be certain, except class actions and taxes.” – (paraphrasing) Ben Franklin **

HiResWhile tax season is now behind most of us, things are just starting to heat up for Intuit, Inc., owner of one of the largest online tax preparation systems – TurboTax.  On April 12, 2016, Intuit was sued in a putative class action in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey over warranty and damage limitations in TurboTax’s Terms of ServiceRubin v. Intuit Inc., Case No. 3:16-CV-02029 (Dist. N.J. April 12, 2016) (Dkt. No. 1).  The claim is made under New Jersey’s  Truth in Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (“TCCWNA”), N.J.S.A 56:12-14 et seq.  Due, perhaps, to its difficult-to-remember acronym, the TCCWNA gathered dust on the shelves of plaintiff consumer lawyers for the first thirty years of its existence.  This is surprising given that the TCCWNA has two significant advantages over New Jersey’  other consumer statute, The Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 et seq.:  (1) The TCCWNA provides for a minimum of $100 statutory damages per consumer (N.J.S.A. 56:12-17) and (2)  The TCCWNA doesn’t require putative class members to have actually purchased anything.  N.J.S.A. 56:12-15 (TCCWNA applies to “consumer[s] or prospective consumer[s]”).  .

Which brings us to TurboTax.  Intuit has a fairly standard Terms of Service page on its website that users must agree to – terms of service that are particularly apropos for a company whose principal service results in the filing of income tax returns under penalty of perjury by consumers who tend to wait until the last minute to perform this painful task with varying degrees of care.  These terms include an acknowledgement by the user that “THE SITE IS PROVIDED ‘AS IS,’ WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED” as well as an agreement that “DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES” are prohibited.  Of course, TurboTax’s terms also provide that, where the laws of particular states do not permit Intuit to limit its liability in certain ways, those limitations do not apply to users in those states, but otherwise, “THE . . . LIABILITY OF INTUIT . . . IS LIMITED TO THE GREATEST EXTENT PERMITTED BY SUCH STATE LAW.”

How can such common provisions in website terms of use result in liability under New Jersey law?  Enter the TCCWNA, which provides, “No seller . . . shall in the course of his business offer to any consumer or prospective consumer or enter into any written consumer contract or give or display any written consumer warranty, notice or sign . . . which includes any provision that violates any clearly established legal right of a consumer . . . established by State or Federal law.”  N.J.S.A 56:12-15.  In Rubin, the plaintiffs contend that Intuit’s standard warranty limitations violate New Jersey common law and State and Federal statutes, including New Jersey’s Products Liability Act, its Punitive Damages Act, and the Uniform Commercial Code.

“But wait!” you say.  What about Intuit’s statement in the TurboTax Terms of Service that the damages limitations are void where prohibited?  Ironically, according to the plaintiffs, that provision is not only not exculpatory – it’s actually a separate violation of the TCCWNA.  The New Jersey statute provides, “No consumer contract, notice or sign shall state that any of its provisions is or may be void, unenforceable or inapplicable in some jurisdictions without specifying which provisions are or are not void, unenforceable or inapplicable within the State of New Jersey; provided, however, that this shall not apply to warranties.”  N.J.S.A. 56:12-16.  Even when a company tries to comply with state statutes, it may be violating New Jersey’s TCCWNA.

It will be interesting to see whether the U.S. Supreme Court’s anticipated decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robbins, No. 13-1339, cert. granted (U.S. April 27, 2015) will have an impact on the progress of TCCWNA cases.  In Spokeo, the Supreme Court is mulling over whether a plaintiff/class representative has standing to assert claims based upon the violation of federal statutes – in that case the Fair Credit Reporting Act – where the plaintiff has not been injured.  If the Court determines that there is no standing if there is no injury, that reasoning may have some applicability to the TCCWNA, which does not require the plaintiff to have even used the service or purchased the product.  In addition, it’s an open question as to whether “prospective consumers” can be included in a putative TCCWNA — at least in federal court in the Third Circuit — under the circuit’s ascertainability requirement:  Can there be “a reliable and administratively feasible mechanism for determining whether putative class members fall within the class definition” [Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 355 (3d Cir. 2013)],where the class consists of anybody who laid eyes on a website’s terms of use?  But for the forseeable future, ecommerce companies should closely review their terms of use to ensure that they do not run afoul of the TCCWNA.

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Never Surrender – The Ninth Circuit’s Follow-Up to the Campbell-Ewald Anti-Pickoff Rule

** Insurer Fails to Convince Circuit Court that Escrow Payment Moots TCPA Case **                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                

Definition of the word escrow from a law text book

As we’ve posted about recently, in February 2016 the U.S. Supreme Court in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 193 L. Ed. 2d 571 (2016) resolved a circuit split over whether a defendant can “pick off” the lead plaintiff in a putative class action lawsuit via a Rule 68 offer of judgment that affords the plaintiff with complete relief prior to class certification.  The majority, relying on “first-year law student” contract law, held that if the plaintiff doesn’t accept the offer of judgment – “however good the terms” (i.e., total surrender) — the defendant’s offer is a “legal nullity” and, therefore, the case or controversy remains.  In reaching its decision, the Court felt compelled to distinguish “a trio of 19th-century railroad tax cases” (as if the fact that they were 19th-century railroad tax cases wasn’t enough) where the defendants actually paid the amounts alleged by the plaintiffs to be owed.  The Court did so thusly: “In all three cases, the railroad’s payments had fully satisfied the asserted tax claims, and so extinguished them.” 136 S. Ct. at 671.  This distinction, however, opened a small can of worms.  What if the defendant deposited the full amount of the plaintiff’s claim into an account payable to the plaintiff, and the court then entered judgment in that amount?  While the majority raised this hypothetical, they declined to answer it.

Acting with lightning speed, Allstate Insurance Company — embroiled in a putative TCPA class action in the Northern District of California — deposited $20,000 in a bank escrow account “pending entry of a final District Court order or judgment directing the escrow agent to pay the tendered funds to [the lead plaintiff], requiring Allstate to stop sending non-emergency telephone calls and short message service messages to [the plaintiff] in the future and dismissing this action as moot.”  Chen v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 13-16816, 2016 WL 1425869, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 12, 2016).  Unfortunately for Allstate, the matter was already on appeal to the Ninth Circuit on the Rule 68 offer of judgment issue subsequently decided by the Supreme Court, so the district court wasn’t given first crack at deciding whether to enter Allstate’s proposed judgment.

On April 12, 2016 – before the ink was dry on the Campbell-Ewald opinion – the Ninth Circuit slammed shut the mootness door the Supreme Court left open.  The court first observed that Allstate had not met the Supreme Court’s requirement that the plaintiff actually receive the complete relief offered – Allstate’s money was in escrow and it could get it back.  2016 WL 1425869, at *7.  Allstate rejoined that all the court of appeals needed to do was order the district court to enter its proposed order and the money would be out of its hands for all eternity.  The Ninth Circuit said no.  If the plaintiff doesn’t want complete relief, he shouldn’t be forced to accept it – as long as he’s not bullheaded or crazy.  And “[a] named plaintiff exhibits neither obstinacy nor madness by declining an offer of judgment on individual claims in order to pursue relief on behalf of members of a class.”  2016 WL 1425869, at *9.  While the Ninth Circuit distinguished Allstate’s relationship to its money from the situation where a defendant deposited the money in the court registry and could not reclaim it, the distinction is without a difference because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 67 requires notice to the plaintiff and a court order permitting the deposit.

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Au Naturale

** How can we “Know It When We See It” to divine when the FTC will label an all natural claim misleading? **                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               

On April 12, 2016, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) announced proposed settlements with four skin care, shampoo and sunscreen companies over the use of the term, “natural” in their product labeling and advertising (ShiKai, Rocky Mountain Sunscreen, EDEN BodyWorks, and Beyond Coastal products).  The FTC issued an administrative complaint against a fifth skin care company making similar claims.  The gravamen of each of these actions is the FTC’s assertion that the companies’ products “are not ‘all natural’ because they contain[ ] or contained at least one synthetic ingredient.”  The FTC’s Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection, in announcing the settlements, proclaimed, “’All natural’ or ‘100 percent natural’ means just that — no artificial ingredients or chemicals.”  “Companies should take a lesson from these cases.”

But what exactly is that lesson?  To answer that – lets recall the history of federal “natural” regulations (or more accurately, the lack thereof).  The Food & Drug Administration (“FDA”) is the primary federal agency responsible for the labeling of food, drugs and cosmetics sold in the United States to, among other things, prevent consumer deception.  21 U.S.C. § 331(a).  Three of the five companies sued by the FTC sell “drugs” (sunscreen).  So what is the FDA’s position on “natural”?  As we’ve blogged about before, the FDA has repeatedly demurred on the question asserting that “priority food public health and safety matters are largely occupying the limited resources that FDA has to address food matters.”  Letter from Leslie Kux, Assistant Commissioner for Policy Food and Drug Administration, to Judges Gonzalez Rogers, White, and McNulty, January 6, 2014 (responding to the question of whether GMO seed used to grow corn rendered the corn unnatural).  The FDA, from time to time, has relied on its 1991 “informal policy” of defining “natural” for food for human consumption “as meaning that nothing artificial or synthetic (including all color additives regardless of source) has been included in, or has been added to, a food that would not normally be expected to be in the food.”  56 Fed. Reg. 60421, 60466-60467 (Nov. 27, 1991).  For example, in a November 16, 2011 Warning Letter to Alexia Foods, the FDA asserted that the company had misbranded its mushrooms and red potatoes as “All Natural” when they contained disodium dihydrogen pyrophosphate — a synthetic chemical preservative.

Very recently, as we’ve also posted about, the FDA has requested public comment on a possible definition of “natural” for food labeling signaling that the FDA may be ready to issue some sort of concrete “natural” rule in the near future, at least as the term applies to food.  It will be interesting to see if things have changed since 1991, when the FDA, in assessing the possibility of consumer confusion, concluded that “natural” was already in “widespread use” “on a variety of products to mean a variety of things” with “consumers regard[ing] many uses of th[e] term as non-informative.”  56 Fed. Reg. 60421, 60466.

Unlike the FDA, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (“USDA”)  rules on “natural” for meat and poultry appear quite definitive.  According to the USDA’s Food Standards and Labeling Policy Book, “natural” means “(1) the product does not contain any artificial flavor or flavoring, coloring ingredient, or chemical preservative (as defined in 21 CFR 101.22), or any other artificial or synthetic ingredient; and (2) the product and its ingredients are not more than minimally processed.”  Is this a “bright line” test?  Not really.  The USDA Policy Book states that “Relatively severe processes, e.g., solvent extraction, acid hydrolysis, and chemical bleaching would clearly be considered more than minimal processing.”  Okay, so no “relatively severe processes.”  But it also states. . . “the presence of an ingredient which has been more than minimally processed would not necessarily preclude the product from being promoted as natural . . . if it can be demonstrated that the use of such an ingredient would not significantly change the character of the product to the point that it could no longer be considered a natural product.”  Oh.

In the end, the USDA relies on disclosure to alleviate consumer confusion.  The Policy Book states:  “All products claiming to be natural or a natural food should be accompanied by a brief statement which explains what is meant by the term natural, i.e., that the product is a natural food because it contains no artificial ingredients and is only minimally processed. This statement should appear directly beneath or beside all natural claims or, if elsewhere on the principal display panel; an asterisk should be used to tie the explanation to the claim.”  Because the USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service must approve all meat and poultry product labels before they are placed on store shelves, any issues over the nuances of whether a product is “natural” are worked out on the front end.

Brief philosophical interlude:  The USDA’s definition of “natural” has little or nothing to do with consumer health – a smoked meat (thought by some to expose consumers to carcinogens) is “natural” but a meat that undergoes relatively benign acid hydrolysis to round out flavor and break down proteins so they are more easily digested is unnatural.  But if a consumer equates “natural” with “wholesome” (the FDA’s term) or “healthy,” does the USDA’s “natural” rule help consumers at all?

This brings us to the FTC – the agency with the longest history of not making rules on “natural” claims.  “On December 17, 1982, the Commission decided to terminate its proposed trade regulation rule on food advertising.  The proposed rule would have regulated energy and weight control claims, fatty acid and cholesterol claims, and natural food claims.”  48 Fed . Reg. 23270 (May 24, 1983) (emphasis added).  This avoidance has continued unabated, up to and including the FTC’s revisions to the Green Guides governing environmental marketing claims.  “The final Guides do not address organic, sustainable, and natural claims. . . .  For . . . sustainable and natural claims, the Commission lacks sufficient evidence [presumably of what consumers think “natural” means] on which to base general guidance.”  16 CFR Part 260 (Oct. 6, 2010).

Of course, the FTC has long maintained that it has the right, on a case-by-case basis, to take enforcement actions against companies that use “natural” deceptively.  48 Fed . Reg. 23270 (May 24, 1983).  But in the absence of an actual rule, the FTC is relying on the Potter Stewart pornography principle  — “it know it when it sees it.”  Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).  That’s fine, but, under those circumstances, it is difficult for companies “to take a lesson” from the FTC’s five recent enforcement actions other than that the FTC doesn’t want to see chemicals in natural products.

But maybe that isn’t even true.  The proposed settlements that the FTC announced on April 12th appear on the surface to be easy ones – the challenged products contain substances with chemical-sounding names like Dimethicone, Polyethylene, Butyloctyl salicylate, Neopentyl glycol Diethylhexanoate, Ethylhexyl glycerin, Phenoxyethanol, Polyquaternium-7 and/or Caprylyl glycol.  The only public statement from one of the settling companies who sells sunscreen attributed its natural labeling to a mistaken belief that it could make the claim if the active ingredients were natural.  But is important to observe that the FTC complaint against the single settlement hold out, California Naturel, is much narrower than the other complaints citing to only one “synthetic ingredient” – dimethicone – in a single product – Sunscreen SPF 30 – despite the fact that California Naturel (according to its beautifully designed website) sells a variety of skin care products that include numerous substances that have chemical-sounding names (e.g., Polyglyceryl-3 polyricinoleate – “an emulsifier made from glycerol and fatty acids”). California Naturel takes care on its website to explain when its ingredients are “extracted,” or “derived from” natural sources, but does the extraction or derivation processes render the ingredients “synthetic”?  Apparently not.

So here we are – waiting for the FDA to maybe shed some light on what “natural” really means.  But it is certainly understandable why the agency, as well as the FTC, have hitherto been reluctant to make a call on the issue.  And whatever rule the FDA publishes, we must bear in mind its own admonition back in 1991 — “natural” “mean a variety of things” with “consumers regard[ing] many uses of th[e] term as non-informative.”  Will the FDA’s pronouncement distill the essence of consumer understanding on the subject (if it even exists) or will it simply be a set of rules?  If not the former, perhaps it’s better for the FTC and the FDA to continue to rely on the Potter Principle.

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Is the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine Alive Again for “Natural” Defendants?

 ** Ninth Circuit Stays Natural Case In “Food Court” **
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The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is a prudential means to stay or dismiss a party’s claims if the claims are better adjudicated or answered by an administrative agency – it “is concerned with promoting proper relationships between the courts and administrative agencies charged with particular regulatory duties.” Ellis v. Tribune Television Co., 443 F.3d 71, 81 (2d Cir.2006). It is properly applied “whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body.” Id. When applicable, “a court defers to the agency for advisory findings and either stays the pending action or dismisses it without prejudice” Johnson v. Nyack Hosp., 86 F.3d 8, 11 (2d Cir.1996).

Courts must make a case-by-case determination when considering primary jurisdiction.   In doing so, they generally focus on: (1) whether the question at issue is within the conventional experience of judges or whether it involves technical or policy considerations within the agency’s particular field of expertise; (2) whether the question at issue is particularly within the agency’s discretion; (3) whether there exists a substantial danger of inconsistent rulings; and (4) whether a prior application to the agency has been made. Nat’l Commc’ns Ass’n v. AT & T, 46 F.3d 220, 222 (2d Cir.1995).

There was a time when “primary jurisdiction” was in vogue for “all natural” defendants because of the perception that the FDA was the proper administrative body to answer the question of what sort of ingredients and products qualify as “natural.”  The leading case was Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 905 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2012). This case involved Hain Celestial’s cosmetics products with labels including “All Natural,” “Pure Natural,” or “Pure, Natural & Organic.” In this case, the putative nationwide class representatives alleged that they had been duped into purchasing Hain’s cosmetics that allegedly contained synthetic and artificial ingredients such as benzyl alcohol.  As is typical in such cases, the plaintiffs sought damages and injunctive relief under a variety of theories including statutory violations under the California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act. The district court dismissed the case, applying primary jurisdiction, holding that “[in] the absence of any FDA rules or regulations (or even informal policy statements) regarding the use of the word “natural” on cosmetics labels, the court declines to make any independent determination of whether defendants’ use of “natural” was false or misleading. Doing so would “risk undercutting the FDA’s expert judgments and authority.” Other district courts invoked the agency’s primary jurisdiction to wait and see if the FDA intended to offer  regulations regarding the use of the term “natural” (in particular in GMO food cases). In re Gen. Mills, Inc. Kix Cereal Litig., No. CIV–A–12–249 KM, 2013 WL 5943972 (D.N.J. Nov. 1, 2013), Barnes v. Campbell Soup Co., No. C12–05185 JSW, 2013 WL 5530017 (N.D.Cal. July 25, 2013) (GMO food case), Cox v. Gruma Corp., No. 12–CV–6502 YGR, 2013 WL 3828800 (N.D.Cal. July 11, 2013) (GMO case).

Undeterred by the district court’s dismissal, the Plaintiffs in Astiana went on a two pronged attack. They went directly to the FDA seeking guidance on the definition of “natural.”  The FDA responded by letter stating – “cosmetic public health and safety matters are currently fully occupying the resources that FDA has available for proceedings on cosmetics matters” and “proceedings to define ‘natural’ do not fit within [the agency’s] current health and safety priorities.” Plaintiffs also appealed to the Ninth Circuit.  Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 783 F.3d 753, 759 (9th Cir. 2015). The Ninth Circuit held that — while the district’s court primary jurisdiction doctrine decision was not wrong — it should have stayed the matter awaiting an FDA response. Upon remand, the district court revisited the primary jurisdiction argument and, recognizing that the recent FDA letter demonstrated that the FDA has no interest in the subject matter and, therefore,  referral to the FDA would be futile, the court denied defendant’s motion to stay on primary jurisdiction grounds. Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., No. 4:11-cv-06342-PJH (N.D. Cal. October 9, 2015) (Dkt. No. 114).

Courts in other jurisdictions have followed this same rejection of the primary jurisdiction doctrine argument made by cosmetic company defendants in “natural” cases. Goldemberg v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Companies, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 3d 467, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“the FDA has not begun to promulgate a rule concerning the term natural in cosmetics . . [i]nstead, it recently declined to make such a determination . . . [t]hus, as the agency is not simultaneously contemplating the same issue . . . this factor weighs against applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine”); Paulino v. Conopco, Inc., No. 14-CV-5145 JG RML, 2015 WL 4895234, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2015); Langan v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Companies, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 3d 284, 290 (D. Conn. 2015); Fagan v. Neutrogena Corp., No. 5:13-CV-01316-SVW-OP, 2014 WL 92255, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014) (“Plaintiffs’ claims are not barred by the doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . . [as the] FDA has affirmed that proceedings to define the term natural in the context of cosmetics do not fit within its current health and safety priorities.”); see also Reid v. GMC Skin Care USA Inc., No. 815CV277BKSCFH, 2016 WL 403497, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2016) (rejecting primary jurisdiction in case alleging that face cream with “DNA repair effect” statements was misleading); Randolph v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. 13-80581-CIV, 2014 WL 1018007, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2014).

At the same time that the primary jurisdiction doctrine was being buried with respect to “natural” claims, it remained viable in various food cases, particularly those presenting discrete technical questions, i.e. Backus v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 3d 909, 933 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (primary jurisdiction invoked on question of the amount of trans fat in baked goods that is safe); Saubers v. Kashi Co., 39 F. Supp. 3d 1108 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (primary jurisdiction invoked with respect to “evaporated cane juice” labels) (collecting cases). The basis for primary jurisdiction in particular in the ECJ cases is that that FDA has indicated that it WILL issue regulatory guidance on evaporated cane juice – but not until the end of 2016. See also Draft Guidance for Industry on Ingredients Declared as Evaporated Cane Juice; Reopening of Comment Period; Request for Comments, Data, and Information, 79 Fed.Reg. 12,507 (Mar. 5, 2014).  Most evaporated cane juice cases are currently stayed (or dismissed) see, e.g., Gitson, et al. v. Clover-Stornetta Farms, Inc., Case No. 3:13-cv-01517-EDL (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2016) (extending ECJ stay for an additional 180 days, until August 2016) (Laporte, J.); Swearingen v. Amazon Preservation Partners, Inc., Case No. 13-cv-04402-WHO (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2016) (Orrick, J.) (extending ECJ stay and continuing case management conference until July 2016). A few judges have lifted the ECJ stay (impatient at the FDA’s movement) but they appear to be out-liers. See Figy v. Lifeway Foods, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-4828-TEH (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2016), Dkt. No. 57; Swearingen v. Pacific Foods of Oregon, Inc., No. 13-cv-04157 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2015), Dkt. No. 61.

But we digress.  Back to “natural” and a significant development.  In November 2015, the FDA issued a request for comments regarding the use of the term “natural” in connection with food product labeling. See Use of the Term “Natural” in the Labeling of Human Food Products; Request for Information and Comments, 80 Fed. Reg. 69,905 (Nov. 12, 2015)See our previous blog post.  While noteworthy in and of itself, the FDA’s requests for comments also raised the secondary issue of whether the FDA’s new-found interest in potentially defining “natural” with respect to foods  triggers the primary jurisdiction doctrine?   Last week, the Ninth Circuit answered – Yes. In Kane v. Chobani, LLC, No. 14-15670, 2016 WL 1161782, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 24, 2016), the circuit court dealt with an appeal from the Northern District of California where buyers of Chobani fruit flavored Greek yogurt filed suit against  the company alleging that its labels and advertising violated California law because the “all natural” yogurt included fruit juice and turmeric.  Before the district court, the plaintiffs had a difficult time articulating why it was plausible to allege that fruit juice and turmeric are unnatural vacillating between the argument that it is unnatural to use these ingredients to color yogurt and the argument that the fruit juices at issue were so heavily processed that they are no longer natural.  Ultimately the district court found that the case warranted dismissal on Rule 9(b) and 12(b)(6) grounds. Kane v. Chobani, LLC, 973 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1138 (N.D. Cal. 2014).  Plaintiffs appealed on the basis that under primary jurisdiction their case should have been stayed – not dismissed. And the Ninth Circuit agreed,  vacating the dismissal and remanding to the district court under a stay pending resolution of the FDA’s “natural” proceedings. So a win for the plaintiffs in Chobani – but one that defendants will take careful note of – in the Ninth Circuit and beyond.

 

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