Consumer Class Action

Is Coconut Oil “Healthy”?

Consumer Class Action, Food, , , , ,

** What are Courts Making of the Plentiful Health Claims Made About Coconut Oil? **                                                                                                                                                                 

By: Brent E. Johnson                                                                                                                                                                                                      

Coconut products are taking an increasingly prominent place in the health food aisles – the shelves are stocked with everything from coconut water to coconut milk to coconut flour.  In particular, the last decade has seen the re-emergence of coconut oil (helped by a platoon of celebrity endorsers) as a health food staple.  Many marketers have touted  coconut oil as a “healthy alternative” to other types of cooking oils.  Litigation relating to coconut oil health claims has followed in the last twelve months.  The claims made in such lawsuits follow two main themes.  First, that coconut oil is inherently unhealthy – and to advertise otherwise is misleading.  And second, that health claims made with respect to coconut oil violate specific FDA regulations regarding the term “healthy.”

As to the first claim, it is not particularly controversial that low density lipoproteins (LDL) cholesterol — the so called “bad” cholesterol — contributes to fatty buildup in arteries raising the risk for heart attack, stroke and peripheral artery disease.  There also appears to be no question that saturated fats cause the human body to produce excess LDL’s – and that coconut oil is about 90% saturated fat (which is a higher percentage than butter (about 64% saturated fat), beef fat (40%), or even lard (also 40%)).  What is unclear is whether all saturated fats are equally “bad” – as some studies suggest that coconut oil’s particular type of saturated fat (medium-chain triglycerides (MCTs)) actually aids in weight loss and helps lower blood cholesterol levels.  The science behind these benefits is unsettled.

As to the second question, FDA regulates “nutrient content claim[s].”  As we have blogged about in the past, in order to “use the term ‘healthy’ or related words (e.g., ‘health,’ ‘healthful,’ ‘healthfully,’ ‘healthfulness,’ ‘healthier,’ ‘healthiest,’ ‘healthily,’ and ‘healthiness’)” as nutrient content claims, the food must satisfy specific “conditions for fat, saturated fat, cholesterol, and other nutrients.” 21 C.F.R § 101.65(d)(2).  Specifically, under 21 C.F.R. § 101.65(d)(2)(i)(F), to make a “healthy” claim, the food must (1) be “’Low fat’ as defined in § 101.62(b)(2),” (2) be “’Low [in] saturated fat’ as defined in § 101.62(c)(2),” and (3) contain “[a]t least 10 percent of the RDI or the DRV per RA of one or more of vitamin A, vitamin C, calcium, iron, protein or fiber.” See 21 C.F.R. § 101.65(d)(2)(i)(F).  Section 101.62(b)(2)(i)(B) provides the applicable definition of “low fat” for coconut oil products because it has a “Reference Amount Customarily Consumed” (RACC) of less than 30 grams. Under  § 101.62(b)(2)(i)(B)’s definition, a food is low fat only if it “contains 3 g or less of fat per reference amount customarily consumed and per 50 g of food.”  Under 21 C.F.R. § 101.62(c)(2), a food is “low saturated fat” only if it “contains 1 g or less of saturated fatty acids per (RACC) and not more than 15 percent of calories from saturated fatty acids.”  There is very little argument that coconut oil does not meets these metrics.  It is not low in fat or low in saturated fat under the FDA’s definitions.  But is a general claim of healthfulness on a label a claim about its “nutrient content” – or is it a more generic statement regarding the product overall?

These claims have been made numerous times in recent class actions against coconut oil companies.  The facts are not always identical — in some cases the product’s label explicitly states the product is “healthy,” in others the labels use more diffuse terms such that the product is a “superfood” or “nutritious,” and in other cases “healthfulness” is implied by the context of the advertising as a whole.  In any case, to date no court has adjudicated the underlying questions raised.  The first set of questions revolve around the issue of whether or not coconut oil’s saturated fats are inherently unhealthful?  In answering that question, what does “healthy” even mean in the context of cooking oil?  Does it mean that there is a complete absence of anything harmful?  Does it mean that it is going to make you live longer – or just that it is not going to kill you?  Or somewhere in between?  Does context play a part here?  Would a consumer be cognizant that fats, such as oils, may be healthy in limited ways, but are not if consumed in certain forms or in certain quantities?  Is advertising healthy cooking oil different, say, to advertising healthy vitamin supplements?  The second unresolved issue is whether claims made on a label about health benefits “nutrition” claims as that term is used in FDA regulations?  In Hunter v. Nature’s Way Prod., LLC, No. 16CV532-WQH-BLM, 2016 WL 4262188, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2016), the District Court held that these questions could not be definitively answered by defendants on a motion to dismiss and so the case has continued to the class certification stage.  The District Court in Jones v. Nutiva, Inc., No. 16-CV-00711-HSG (KAW), 2016 WL 5387760 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2017), held the same, noting that concepts like “health” and “nutrition” are “difficult to measure concretely” but that the court would not “give the defendant the benefit of the doubt by dismissing the statement as puffery” when the context of the advertising and labeling plays into the analysis of the health claims.  This case is also headed towards a certification decision with a motion hearing set for early 2018.  Likely, these same questions will raise their heads again on certification briefing, i.e., Is “healthfulness” such an amorphous concept that there is no commonality amongst the class?

In Zemola v. Carrington Tea Co., No. 3:17-cv-00760 (S.D. Cal), defendants have taken a different tact – they have moved for a primary jurisdiction stay of their case based on the pending FDA regulatory proceedings to redefine the term “healthy” in the labeling of food products.  As discussed in a prior post, in September 2016, FDA issued a guidance document (Guidance for Industry: Use of the Term “Healthy” in the Labeling of Human Food Products) stating that FDA does not intend to enforce the regulatory requirements for products that use the term healthy if the food is not low in total fat, but has a fat profile makeup of predominantly mono and polyunsaturated fats.  FDA also requested public comment on the “Use of the Term “Healthy” in the Labeling of Human Food Products.”  Comments were received from consumers and industry stakeholders, reaching 1,100 before the period closed on April 26, 2017. FDA has not provided a timeline as to when revisions to the definition of “healthy” might occur following these public comments.  The Zemola Court has yet to rule on the request for a stay.

A number of coconut oil cases have settled.  See James Boswell et al. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 8:16-cv-00278 (C.D. Cal) ($775,000 coconut oil settlement based on “healthy” labelling); Christine Cumming v. BetterBody Food & Nutrition LLC, Case No. 37-2016-00019510-CU-BT-CTL (San Diego Sup. Ct) ($1 million settlement).

Splitting Hairs Over Milk

Beverage, Consumer Class Action, False Advertising, Food, , , ,

** Class Actions Dismissed (and Stayed) on Question of Who Can Call Their Product Milk **                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                

By: Brent E. Johnson                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             

As anyone who has watched “Meet the Parents” knows, “milk” has traditionally been applied to mammalian products.  Recently, however, the term has been expanded to describe a wide range of non-dairy products such as liquids partially derived from almonds, oats, soy, rice, and cashews.  Can these products rightly be called “milk”?  Plaintiffs’ attorneys in California have decided to put that question to the test.  In Kelley v. WWF Operating Co., No. 1:17-CV-117-LJO-BAM, (E.D. Cal), plaintiffs based their suit on Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations dealing with “imitation” foods – defined by FDA as a food which “act[s] . . . [a]s a substitute for and resembles another food but is nutritionally inferior to that food.”  21 C.F.R. § 101.3 (e)(1).  Under these regulations, an imitation food must be clearly labelled (in a type of uniform size and prominence to the name of the food imitated) with the word “imitation.”  21 C.F.R. § 101.3 (e).  Otherwise, the product is “misbranded” under  section 403(c) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.  In Kelly, plaintiffs alleged that WWF’s Silk Almond Milk beverages should have been labelled with the “imitation” nomenclature because they are not “milk”  and (in some respects) are nutritionally inferior.

Defendant responded with a motion to dismiss, arguing that no reasonable customer would be misled by the use of the term “almond milk” on its products because the consuming public knows exactly what it is getting – what Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines as “a food product produced from seeds or fruit that resembles and is used similarly to cow’s milk.”

The Kelly case follows a broader, and as yet unresolved, public debate on this definition.  Indeed, there’s a war over the definition of milk.  Both the House and Senate are currently contemplating versions of the Defending Against Imitations and Replacements of Yogurt, Milk and Cheese to Promote Regular Intake of Dairy Everyday (DAIRY PRIDE) Act (H.R.778 House Version) (S.130 Senate Version).  The bills are sponsored by senators and congressmen from dairy rich states (Sen. Tammy Baldwin (D-WI) and Rep. Peter Welch (D-VT)). The House bill included five original co-sponsors: Rep. Michael Simpson (R-ID); Rep. Sean Duffy (R-WI); Rep. Joe Courtney (D-CT); Rep. David Valadao (R-CA); and Rep. Suzan DelBene (D-WA).  If enacted, the bills would amend the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to prohibit the sale of any food using the market name of a dairy product that is not the milk of a hooved animal, is not derived from such milk or does not contain such milk as a primary ingredient.  As supporters of the bills have observed (summed up by a quote from the Holstein Association USA): “After milking animals for 40 years I’ve never been able to milk an almond.”

FDA has not stepped into the fray  even though  it has been petitioned to do so.  In March 2017, FDA received a Citizen Petition from the Good Food Institute requesting it promulgate “regulations clarifying how foods may be named by reference to the names of other foods” and specifically requesting, among other things, that FDA issue regulations that would permit plant-based beverages to be called “milk.”  On the other side, the National Milk Producers Federation (NMPF) wrote in a letter addressed to the FDA and sent on August 29th that the application of dairy-related terms like “milk” to market plant-based beverages creates consumer confusion in the marketplace.

In Kelly, the Court was not troubled by FDA’s inaction.  It found that, because FDA was “poised” to consider the question raised by this suit (although it has never said as much), it was “on their radar,” and therefore FDA should have the opportunity to decide the question, itself.  Under the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine – which we have blogged about in the past – the Court stayed the matter indefinitely.  Kelley v. WWF Operating Co., No. 1:17-CV-117-LJO-BAM, 2017 WL 2445836, at *6 (E.D. Cal. June 6, 2017).

In a similar case filed against Blue Diamond in California state court but transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Central District, the defendant was successful on its motion to dismiss.  Painter v. Blue Diamond Growers, No. 1:17-CV-02235-SVW-AJW, (C.D. Cal. May 24, 2017).  In that case, Judge Wilson held that it was completely implausible that there was consumer confusion.  Judge Wilson held that “Almond milk” accurately describes defendant’s product.  See Ang v. Whitewave Foods Co., No. 13-CV-1953, 2013 WL 6492353, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2013) (finding as a matter of law that no reasonable consumer would confuse soymilk or almond milk for dairy milk); Gilson v. Trader Joe’s Co., No. 13-CV-01333-WHO, 2013 WL 5513711, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 20 13) (finding at the pleading stage that no reasonable consumer would believe that a product labeled Organic Soy Milk, including the explicit statement that it is “LACTOSE & DAIRY FREE”, has the same qualities as cow’s milk).  Quoting from the Ang court, Judge Wilson reasoned that a reasonable consumer knows veggie bacon does not contain pork, that flourless chocolate cake does not contain flour, and that e-books are not made out of paper.  Judge Wilson also held that plaintiff’s case would create a de facto labelling standard using state law that was stricter than the FDCA requirement and, therefore the case was preempted.  See also Gilson v. Trader Joe’s Co., No. 13-CV-01333-VC, 2015 WL 9121232, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 20 15) (finding state law claims against the use of the term “soymilk” preempted by the FDCA).

Plaintiffs in the Painter case have appealed to the Ninth Circuit.  Painter v. Blue Diamond Growers, No. 17-55901 (9th. Cir. June 26, 2017).  We’ll keep you updated on the progress of the case.

FYI on ECJ

Consumer Class Action, False Advertising, Food, , , ,

** In the Wake of FDA’s Guidance, Evaporated Cane Juice Cases Continue . . . .   **                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          

 By: Brent E. Johnson         

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              As we have blogged about in the past the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued guidance in 2016 that it is false or misleading to describe sweeteners made from sugar cane as “evaporated cane juice” (ECJ). Guidance for Industry: Ingredients Declared as Evaporated Cane Juice.

It is common knowledge that cane sugar is made by processing sugar cane – crushing the cane to extract the juice, evaporating that juice, and crystalizing the syrup that remains.  To make white sugar, the crystals undergo additional crystallization to strip out molasses.  The primary difference between standard white sugar and the product known as ECJ is that the latter skips the second crystallization process.  ECJ is sold as a standalone product (e.g., in health food stores) and since the early 2000’s has been introduced as a white sugar substitute in products such as yogurt and lemonade.

The plaintiffs’ bar alleges that ECJ is identical to refined sugar from a nutrient and caloric standpoint and, therefore, food labelling using the term ECJ misleads health-conscious consumers into thinking it is a better sweetener option (or not sugar at all).  Defendants respond that ECJ is precisely what it says — the evaporated juice from the cane of the sugar plant — and is therefore a wholly accurate term to describe a type of sweetener that is made from sugar cane but undergoes less processing than white sugar.  See e.g., Morgan v Wallaby Yogurt Company, No. CV 13-0296-CW, 2013 WL 11231160 (N.D. Cal, April 8, 2013) (Mot. to Dismiss).

FDA regulations are implicated in this controversy because they prohibit the use of an ingredient name that is not the “common or usual name” of the food.  21 CFR 101.3 (b) & (d).  The common or usual name of a food or ingredient can be established by common usage or by regulation.  In the case of “sugar,” FDA regulations establish that sucrose obtained by crystallizing sugar cane or sugar beet juice that has been extracted by pressing or diffusion, then clarified and evaporated, is commonly and usually called “sugar.”  21 CFR 101.4(b)(20).  The question for the FDA in 2016 when it was considering its ECJ Guidelines, therefore, was whether ECJ fits under this definition and therefore should be identified by the common or usual name – sugar.  This question was complicated by FDA’s heavy regulation of the term “juice,” which is also defined in the federal register.  21 CFR 101.30.

On October 7, 2009, FDA first stepped into the ECJ fray, publishing a draft guidance entitled “Guidance for Industry: Ingredients Declared as Evaporated Cane Juice” (74 FR 51610) to advise the relevant industries of FDA’s view that sweeteners derived from sugar cane syrup should not be declared on food labels as “evaporated cane juice” because that term falsely suggests the sweetener is akin to fruit juice. On March 5, 2014, FDA reopened the comment period for the draft guidance seeking further comments, data, and information (79 FR 12507).  On May 25, 2016, FDA updated this guidance (81 FR 33538), superseding the 2009 version, but not changing its position that it is false or misleading to describe sweeteners made from sugar cane as ECJ.  FDA reasoned that the term “cane juice”— as opposed to cane syrup or cane sugar—calls to mind vegetable or fruit juice, see 21 CFR 120.1(a), which the FDA said is misleading as sugar cane is not typically eaten as a fruit or vegetable.  As such, the FDA concluded that the term “evaporated cane juice” fails to disclose that the ingredient’s “basic nature” is sugar. 2016 Guidance, Section III.  As support, FDA cited the Codex Alimentarius Commission — a source for international food standards sponsored by the World Health Organization and the United Nations.  FDA therefore advised that “‘evaporated cane juice’ is not the common name of any type of sweetener and should be declared on food labels as ‘sugar,’ preceded by one or more truthful, non-misleading descriptors if the manufacturer so chooses.” 2016 Guidance, Section III.

Bear in mind that FDA guidance is not binding on courts and, in and of itself, does not create a private right of action.  21 U.S.C. § 337(a) (“[A]ll such proceedings for the enforcement, or to restrain violations, of [the FDCA] shall be by and in the name of the United States”); see POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 573 U.S. ___ (2014); Buckman Co. v. Pls.’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 349 n.4 (2001); Turek v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 662 F.3d 423, 426 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Smith v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 888 F. Supp. 2d 945, 955 (S.D. Iowa 2012) (holding that there is no private right of action under USDA statute).  In false advertising cases, the governing test is what consumers, themselves, think – not what FDA thinks.  For example, in Mason v. Coca-Cola Co., plaintiffs alleged that “Diet Coke Plus” was misleading because the word “Plus” implied the product was “healthy” under FDA regulations.  774 F. Supp. 2d 699 (D.N.J. 2011).  The court begged to differ: “At its core, the complaint is an attempt to capitalize on an apparent and somewhat arcane violation of FDA food labeling regulations . . .  not every regulatory violation amounts to an act of consumer fraud . . . . It is simply not plausible that consumers would be aware of [the] FDA regulations [plaintiff relies on].”  Id. at 705 n.4; see also Polk v. KV Pharm. Co., No. 4:09-CV-00588 SNLJ, 2011 WL 6257466, at *7 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 15, 2011);  In re Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc. All Natural Litig., No. 12-MD-2413 RRM RLM, 2013 WL 4647512, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2013) (“[T]he Court [cannot] conclude that a reasonable consumer, or any consumer, is aware of and understands the various federal agencies’ views on the term natural.”)  That said, while FDA’s guidance is not alone dispositive – it certainly lends weight to the question of what a consumer’s state of mind would be with respect to the question of false and misleading labelling.

In the interim between FDA opening up public comment in 2014 on the ECJ question and its release of the 2016 guidance, many cases on this issue were stayed awaiting the outcome of FDA’s deliberations (based on the primary jurisdiction doctrine).  Saubers v. Kashi Co., 39 F. Supp. 3d 1108 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (primary jurisdiction invoked with respect to “evaporated cane juice” labels) (collecting cases) see, e.g., Gitson, et al. v. Clover-Stornetta Farms, Inc., Case No. 3:13-cv-01517-EDL (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2016); Swearingen v. Amazon Preservation Partners, Inc., Case No. 13-cv-04402-WHO (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2016).  With that guidance published, the stayed suits are now set to proceed.  And, as to be expected, many new cases have been filed over ECJ labeling.  Notably, complaints have been filed far away from the traditional “food court” in the Northern District of California.  For example, more than a dozen ECJ cases have recently been filed in St. Louis – the targeted defendants include manufacturers of Pacqui Corn Chips (Dominique Morrison v. Amplify Snack Brands Inc., No. 4:17-cv-00816-RWS (E.D. Mo.) and Bakery on Main Granola (Callanan v. Garden of Light, Inc., No. 4:17-cv-01377 (E.D. Mo.)

Where are courts landing on the ECJ question?

In Swearingen v. Santa Cruz Natural, Inc., No. 13-cv-04291 (N.D. Cal.), a complaint was filed on September 16, 2013, stating that plaintiffs were health-conscious consumers who wish to avoid “added sugars” and who, after noting that “sugar” was not listed as an ingredient, were misled when they purchased Santa Cruz Lemonade Soda, Orange Mango Soda, Raspberry Lemonade Soda, and Ginger Ale Soda which contained ECJ.  On July 1, 2014, the matter was stayed by Judge Illston pursuant to the primary jurisdiction doctrine.  The stay was lifted in June 2016 following a status conference noting the FDA’s final guidance on ECJ – and thereafter supplemental briefing on Santa Cruz’s motion to dismiss was considered.  The Court issued its order on August 17, 2016 (2016 WL 4382544), refusing to dismiss under Rule 12, noting the following:

  • Products not purchased. Santa Cruz argued that plaintiffs had not claimed to have personally purchased every single beverage referred to in the complaint and therefore lacked standing as to those products.  Judge Illston, however, sided with those courts that have concluded that an actual purchase is not required to establish injury-in-fact under Article III, but rather, that when “plaintiffs seek to proceed as representatives of a class . . . ‘the critical inquiry seems to be whether there is sufficient similarity between the products purchased and not purchased.”  2016 WL 4382544 at *8 (quoting Astiana v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., 2012 WL 2990766, at *11 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2012). Because all of the fruit beverages at issue were of the same type of food product, Judge Illston concluded the plaintiffs had standing for all of them.
  • Ingredient Lists. Santa Cruz also argued that plaintiffs could not meet the “reasonable consumer” test of the California consumer protection statutes because it was implausible that a consumer would read the mandatory Nutrition Facts label immediately adjacent to the impugned ingredient list – which clearly identified the product as having 29 grams of sugar — and conclude that it did not contain added sugar.  Judge Illston noted that she had “some reservations as to whether a reasonable consumer would be misled as regarding added sugars in the Lemonade Soda and Ginger Ale Soda” – whose 35 grams and 32 grams of sugar, respectively, were unlikely to occur naturally in ginger root or lemon juice.  She found that the other sodas were closer calls (a reasonable consumer might conclude that the 29 grams of sugar in the Orange Mango Soda, for example, occurred naturally in the orange juice and mango puree listed as ingredients).  Nonetheless, she concluded the question of whether a reasonable consumer would have been misled was a question better decided by a jury and on that basis could not be dismissed under Rule 12.

The matter was thereafter voluntarily withdrawn on May 5, 2017, prior to certification.  One can reasonably assume the withdrawal was the result of settlement – but because the settlement was pre-certification pursuant to Federal Rule 23(e) and was not a class action resolution — no notice or court oversight was required.

In a similar case involving Steaz flavored ice teas, Swearingen v. Healthy Beverage, LLC, No. 13-CV-04385-EMC (N.D. Cal.), the complaint was filed on September 20, 2013, and followed the same allegations of the Santa Cruz case.  On June 11, 2014, Judge Chen stayed the matter pursuant to the primary jurisdiction doctrine.  The stay was lifted on July 22, 2016, and on October 31, 2016, Healthy Beverage moved to dismiss.  The Court ruled on the motion on May 2, 2017, finding for the defendant.

Website Disclosure.  Judge Chen found (in some respects) the opposite of Judge Illston in the Santa Cruz case on this issue of whether disclosure of the sugar content in the product negates whatever confusion may arise from  ECJ labelling.  Healthy Beverage argued that, because it stated on its website [but not on its packaging] that “cane juice is natural sugar,” and plaintiffs’ counsel acknowledged that the plaintiffs “may have looked” at the website,  , plaintiffs could not have been under any illusions that ECJ is anything but sugar.  Plaintiffs’ counsel at the motion hearing answered that plaintiffs “did not focus” on that information on the website.  Judge Chen did not consider this qualification sufficient,, finding that whether or not the plaintiffs “focused” on Healthy Beverage’s disclosure, they conceded that they read it and, therefore, reliance on the packagaging’s ECJ label was not reasonable.

Reese v. Odwalla, Inc., No. 13-CV-00947-YGR (N.D. Cal.) followed the same path as the previous two cases – a Complaint filed in 2013, stayed in 2014, and revived in 2016 after FDA released its ECJ guidance.  The product is Coca-Cola’s Odwalla brand smoothies and juices labelled with ECJ.  On October 10, 2016, a motion to dismiss was filed by Odwalla that the Court ruled on in February of 2017:

Premption:  The crux of Odwalla’s motion to dismiss was express federal preemption.  Odwalla argued that, where the FDCA provides that “no State . . . may directly or indirectly establish under any authority . . . any requirement for a food . . . that is not identical to such standard of [the FDCA]” (21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a)(1)) and the FDA’s guidance on the use of the term ECJ only became final in August 2016, there were no laws prohibiting the use of ECJ prior to the issuance of the 2016 Final Guidance.  Thus, the retroactive imposition of such prohibition would amount to an imposition of non-identical labeling requirements and would therefore be preempted (citing to Wilson v. Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc., 961 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1146 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (finding that retroactive application of FDA’s clarification of an ambiguous regulation would offend due process); Peterson v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 13-CV-3158-L, 2014 WL 3741853, at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 29, 2014) (finding that federal law preempted state claims based on labels prior to FDA’s clarification of labeling requirements).  Judge Rogers rejected this argument, noting that neither the 2009 Draft Guidance nor the 2016 Final Guidance announced a new policy or departure from previously established law.  Judge Rogers reasoned that FDA merely confirmed that ECJ fits the definition of sucrose under the regulations, and, therefore, needs to be labeled as “sugar.”  Thus, the Court found that the State law claims did not contradict Federal law and were not preempted.  This same preemption argument was also rejected in Swearingen v. Late July Snacks LLC, No. 13-CV-04324-EMC, 2017 WL 1806483, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2017).

 

Are You Shipping Me! Is Delivery Charging The Next Big Thing In Consumer Class Actions?

Consumer Class Action, ,

** Shipping and Handling Case Dismissed in California – Beginning of the End? **                                                                                                                                                                                        

By: Brent E. Johnson                                                                                                                                                   

Lately, there’s been quite a bit of buzz over a couple of lawsuits filed in California alleging that internet retailers are charging too much for shipping and handling:  Reider v. Electrolux Home Care Products, Inc., No. 8:17-cv-00026-JLS-DFM (C.D. Cal) and McCoy v. Omaha Steaks International, Inc., No. BC 658076 (Cal. Sup. Ct, L.A. Cnt’y).  Much of the reporting on these cases focuses on the possibility that this claim may be the next big thing in consumer class actions.  How likely is that?

The answer, of course, is “Who knows?”  But a closer inspection of the lawsuits suggests that this litigation too shall pass — and perhaps quickly.  First, both lawsuits were filed by Scott J. Ferrell, the founder of Pacific Trial Attorneys, who is no stranger to consumer class actions against online retailers having brought several under California’s Automatic Renewal Statute. California Business and Professions Code §17600, et seq.  But there hasn’t yet been a break out of these shipping and handling cases.  And second, the Electrolux action is over via a joint stipulation to dismiss filed just yesterday after the District Court granted Electrolux’s motion to dismiss with the observation that any attempt to amend would likely be futile.  Dkt. No. 30, May 8, 2017.

The plaintiff in Electrolux pursued a novel theory of liability in a case where it was undisputed that he was apprised of the shipping charges prior to purchase.  Indeed, there was no way plaintiff could have missed the disclosure because he had to actually choose between shipping options with different charges at the time of purchase:  Ground Service at $7.99; Second Day Air at $15.00; and Next Day Air at $25.00.  (He judiciously chose ground service given his purchase was for a $1.99 vacuum bag.)  Faced with those facts, plaintiff honed in on the unfair prong of California Business & Profession Code § 17200, which prohibits and makes actionable “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent” business practices.

While California courts have not addressed the unfair prong in consumer lawsuits, the Ninth Circuit has – holding that for a business practice to be unfair to consumers it must either:  (1) violate a “legislatively declared” policy; or (2) fail a balancing test that weighs the benefit to the company against the harm to consumers.  Lozano v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 736 (9th Cir. 2007).  In Electrolux, the plaintiff argued that the guidelines of the Direct Marketing Association (“DMA”) that encourage retailers to make sure that their shipping and handling charges bear a reasonable relationship to the actual costs of shipping and handling and a 1980 FTC consent order prohibiting a car dealer from charging more than its actual costs in shipping cars to its showroom reflect a public policy against excessive shipping and handling charges and show that the balance tilts to consumers.

The District Court disagreed.  Dkt. No. 27, April 21, 2017. The “legislatively declared” policy was an easy call – neither the DMA nor the FTC are legislatures.  On the balancing test, the District Court found that there was simply no harm to the plaintiff and, therefore, nothing against which to balance Electrolux’s benefit.  Striking a blow for free markets everywhere, the court observed, “Online shoppers are aware that online merchants are in the business of making money and generating profit, and those looking for the best deals will find their way to the merchants who offer the best combination of quality, price, and service.”  In what should become known as the “Mini Bar Rule,” the court cited Searle v. Wyndham Int’l, Inc., 102 Cal. App. 4th 1327, 1330 (2002) – a case where plaintiffs unsuccessfully challenged a hotel chain’s mandatory 17% service charge:

“Perhaps the best analogy is the one made in Searle. The hotel room guest knows he could buy the $3 minibar candy for less at a neighborhood store. Perhaps he pays the high price so he can stay in his comfortable robe and enjoy the high-priced, in-room movie. In any event,“[t]he minibar patron, like the room service patron, is given both clear notice the service being offered comes at a hefty premium and the freedom to decline the service.” Searle, 102 Cal. App.4th at 1334.” (Dkt. No. 27 at 6).

The District Court in short order dispatched plaintiff’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act claim that the practice of charging inflated shipping and handling fees is deceptive because consumers believe that the charges are reasonably related to the company’s actual costs by noting that Electrolux makes no such representation.

But what of the second shipping and handling charge case —  McCoy v. Omaha Steaks International, Inc., CA Sup. Court, County of Los Angeles, Case No. BC 658076?  That case was filed in Los Angeles Superior Court on April 14, 2017 – a week before the District Court’s decision in Electrolux.  The claims are the same.  The support is the same.  We’ll have to wait and see if the superior court and the federal court agree.

Healthy Conscious

Consumer Class Action, FDA, Food, , , , ,

** FDA Updating Requirements for “Healthy” Claims on Food Labeling **

 

By: Brent E. Johnson

One of the trending areas we have blogged about last year was “healthy” claims in food labelling becoming the new “all natural” target; see Hunter v. Nature’s Way Prod., LLC, No. 16CV532-WQH-BLM, 2016 WL 4262188, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2016) (Coconut Oil); Campbell v. Campbell Soup Co., No 3:16-cv-01005 (S.D. Cal. August 8, 2016) (Dkt 18) (Healthy Request® canned soups); Lanovaz v. Twinings N. Am., Inc., No. 5:12-CV-02646-RMW (N.D. Cal. September 6, 2016) (Twinings bagged tea).  It is a lucrative area for the plaintiff’s bar.  James Boswell et al. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 8:16-cv-00278 (C.D. Cal) (recent $750,000 coconut oil settlement based on “healthy” labeling).

In many respects this trend was kicked off in 2015 by the Food & Drug Administration (FDA) who issued the KIND® company a not so kind letter asking the company, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(1)(A) to remove any mention of the term “healthy” from its packaging and website.  See our prior blog post.  The basis for the FDA’s action is that the term “healthy” has specifically defined meanings under 21 CFR 101.65(d)(2) which includes objective measures such as saturated fat content (must be > 1 g) (see 21 CFR 101.62(c)(2)).  Later in 2016 the FDA seemingly had a change of heart – emailing Kind and stating that the company can return the “healthy” language – as long use “healthy” is used in relation to its “corporate philosophy,” not as a nutrient claim.

Notably, this sparked a wider public health debate about the meaning of “healthy” and whether the focus, for example on the type of fat rather than the total amount of fat consumed, should be reconsidered in light of evolving science on the topic.  In September 2016 the FDA issued a guidance document (Guidance for Industry: Use of the Term “Healthy” in the Labeling of Human Food Products) stating that FDA does not intend to enforce the regulatory requirements for products that use the term healthy if the food is not low in total fat, but has a fat profile makeup of predominantly mono and polyunsaturated fats.

The FDA also requested public comment on the “Use of the Term “Healthy” in the Labeling of Human Food Products” – which comment period ended this week. Comments poured in from consumers and industry stakeholders, reaching 1,100 before the period closed on April 26, 2017. The FDA has not provided a timeline as to when revisions to the definition of “healthy” might occur following these public comments – and it is not clear if President Donald Trump’s January executive order, requiring that two regulations be nixed for every new rule that is passed, will hinder the FDA’s ability to issue a rulemaking on the term “healthy” in the near future.  It is also not clear whether the FDA will combine the rulemaking with its current musing of use of the term “natural” – as the terms are sometimes used synonymously.  Industry groups (and the defense bar) are hopeful though that some clarity will come sooner rather than later.

Sugar in Missouri

Consumer Class Action, False Advertising, Food, , , , , ,

** Do we have a new “sue-me” State for Food and Class Litigators? **

By: Brent E. Johnson

As we blogged about in the past the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued guidance in 2016 that it is false or misleading to describe sweeteners made from sugar cane as “evaporated cane juice” (ECJ). Guidance for Industry: Ingredients Declared as Evaporated Cane Juice.  As anticipated this has opened the way forward for cases against companies using the ECJ term, including of course those cases where the matter had been stayed under the primary jurisdiction doctrine.  Much of this ECJ litigation continues to be focused in state and federal courts in California.

That said, plaintiffs are also filing in other venues.  Missouri for one is becoming increasingly well-known as a plaintiff-friendly jurisdiction following full throated verdicts in product liability cases, such as the $70 million talcum powder case.  And food labeling suits are increasingly being filed as well in this new “sue me” State (in particular, St. Louis City – the 22nd Judicial Circuit, has been called one of “worst places in the nation for a corporation to be sued” and “the new hot spot for litigation tourists.”)  In a recent win for the Plaintiff’s bar with respect to food litigation and labeling claims, a Missouri state court of appeals recently issued an opinion rejecting defenses successful in sister courts. In Murphy v. Stonewall Kitchen, LLC, 503 S.W.3d 308, 310 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) brought under the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA) the plaintiff (and putative class representative) alleged Stonewall Kitchen misrepresented that its cupcake mix was “all natural” when it contained leavening agent sodium acid pyrophosphate (SAPP).  The trial court, relying on the  decision in Kelly v. Cape Cod Potato Chip Co., 81 F.Supp.3d 754 (W.D. Mo. 2015), granted the motion reasoning that because the ingredient label clearly disclosed the presence of SAPP, it was not plausible that a consumer would believe the “all natural” representation on the product including the SAPP.  The Court of Appeals reversed, expressly rejecting the ingredient list defense.

Since Murphy, at least 16 cases have recently been filed in St. Louis on the topic of evaporated cane juice alone.  The targeted defendants include manufacturers of Pacqui Corn Chips (Dominique Morrison v. Amplify Snack Brands Inc., No. 4:17-cv-00816-RWS (E.D. Mo.), Jelly Belly jelly beans(Jason Allen v. Jelly Belly Candy Company, No. 4:17-cv-00588 (E.D. Mo.), and Bakery on Main granola (Callanan v. Garden of Light, Inc., No. 4:17-cv-01377 (E.D. Mo.).  The cases do appear connected, many having the same plaintiff’s counsel.  It is likely too early to call St. Louis the new “food court” – we’ll monitor it throughout the year though to see if it is a “flash in the pan” or not.

Unresolved Issues in Web Accessibility Consumer Lawsuits

Consumer Class Action, DOJ, Title III, ,

** Despite Rash of Lawsuits by Private ADA Litigants, Major Web Accessibility Issues under Title III Remain Unresolved in 2016**                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  

 

By: Brent E. Johnson                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     

Website Accessibility has been an expanding battleground for the plaintiffs’ bar over the past several years.  Title III of the ADA provides that “no individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation.”  42 U.S.C. § 12182.  “Public accommodations” includes private enterprises whose operations affect commerce and who fall within one of twelve enumerated categories (broadly covering everything from grocery stores to amusement parks to places of education).  42 U.S.C. § 12181(7).  Specifically, Title III imposes requirements on businesses to provide “auxiliary aids and services” to the disabled where such aids are necessary for effective communication unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations being offered or would result in undue burden.  42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii); 28 C.F.R. § 36.303.  For website owners, the most common accommodation for the disabled is embedding code beneath graphics that makes it possible for assistive technologies to access information and navigate websites.  According to the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), an international body that develops open standards and guidelines for web developers, there are hundreds of such design options to make a website accessible such as providing links to definitions, removing time limits for activities, providing spoken word versions of text, and ensuring keyboard control for all website functions.

Under the auspices of Title III, plaintiffs’ attorneys have filed hundreds of accessibility suits in the past year claiming that websites are failing to provide necessary accommodations – their favorite target being deep pocketed online retailers.  Notably, only a handful of ADA focused firms are filing these cases — reports show that over 90% of the suits are bought by just 8 different  law firms.  Yet despite the attention garnered by this rash of law suits, two critical issues were NOT resolved in 2016.

The first unresolved issue: Does Title III —  enacted in the pre-internet era (all the way back in 1990) — even apply to websites (and if so, which ones)?  The Third, Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits apply the ADA only to websites that have a physical connection to goods and services available at one of the enumerated places of accommodation listed in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) – i.e. extending the ADA only so far as the online version of a company’s physical store or location.  Accordingly, goods and services without a sufficient nexus to a physical location are not covered by Title III.  See, e.g., Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1114-16 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring some connection between the goods or services complained of and an actual physical place); Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612-13 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding no nexus between challenged insurance policy and services offered to the public from insurance office); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997); Earll v. eBay, Inc., 599 F. App’x 695, 696 (9th Cir. 2015) (ADA claim fails because eBay’s services not connected to any physical place); Cullen v. Netflix, Inc., 600 F. App’x 508, 509 (9th Cir. 2015) (Netflix not subject to ADA because Netflix’s services not connected to any physical place); Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (ADA claim fails because Facebook’s internet services do not have a nexus to a physical place of public accommodation).

The Second and Seventh Circuits, on the other hand, apply the ADA more broadly. See, e.g., Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Assoc. of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding Title III not limited to physical places); Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Scribd, 97 F.Supp. 3d 565 (D. Vt. 2015) (finding website with no nexus to a physical space covered by Title III); Nat’l Assoc. of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196 (D. Mass. 2012) (finding website with no nexus to a physical space covered byTitle III); cf. Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding Title III coverage of websites in dicta); Morgan v. Joint Admin. Bd., Ret. Plan of the Pillsbury Co., 268 F.3d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 2001) (same); see also Nat’l Assoc. of the Deaf, et al. v. MIT, 15-cv-30024, 2016 WL 6652471 (D. Mass. Nov. 4, 2016) (denying motion to stay or dismiss claim that defendant violated Title III of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by failing to caption its online content); Nat’l Assoc. of the Deaf, et al v. Harvard Univ., 15-cv-30023, 2016 WL 6540446 (D. Mass. Nov. 3, 2016) (same).  This circuit split will have to be resolved by the Supreme Court or by congressional intervention.

Which brings us to the second unresolved issue: Will the Department of Justice, pursuant to its statutory authority to promulgate regulations to implement Title II & III, step in and give some guidance on what specific technical accommodations are required (and which are not)?  On July 26, 2010, the Department issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“ANPRM”) on Accessibility of Web Information and Services of State and Local Government Entities and Public Accommodations announcing the Department’s interest in developing more specific requirements or technical standards for website accessibility.  75 Fed. Reg. 43,460 (July 26, 2010).  In the ANPRM, the Department reaffirmed its longstanding position that the ADA applies to websites as public accommodations and reiterated, consistent with the preamble to the 1991 regulations, that the ADA should be interpreted to keep pace with developing technologies.  Id. at 43,464 (“The Department has also repeatedly affirmed the application of Title III to Web sites of public accommodations.”) The Department recognized, however, that in light of inconsistent court decisions on website-related obligations and differing technical standards for determining web accessibility, further guidance was warranted.  Id.  Despite these aspirational statements, the DOJ has yet to finalize its guidance.  Instead, on May 9, 2016, it issued a lengthy Supplemental ANPRM (SANPRM) for state and local government websites, and then extended the comment period.  With those delays — as well as the advent of a new administration — the Title II regulations (for governmental entities) will be pushed back into 2017 and the Title III regulations (which are expected to closely mirror the ones for Title II) to (at the earliest) the end of 2017.  In the meantime, the DOJ appears to be satisfied  intervening on a case by case basis through statement of interest filings (Nat’l Assoc. of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196 (D. Mass. 2012); Gil. v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc, 16-cv-23020 (S.D. Fl. Dec. 12, 2016) (Statement of Interest)) and through consent decrees (see Nat’l Fed. of the Blind and United States v. HRB Digital LLC and HRB Tax Group, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-10799-GAO (decree governing the accessibility of H&R Block’s website); Settlement Agreement Between United States and Ahold U.S.A. Inc. and Peapod LLC.)

These issues  are ripe for action in 2017.  Owners of websites of all stripes should be on the look-out.

Good Vibrations

Consumer Class Action, ,

** Class Plaintiff not Feeling Data Collection Practices of Intimate Personal Consumer Products Maker **

By: Brent E. Johnson                                                                                                                                             _

Digital Data Privacy Protection Searching Concept

In the “You Can’t Make This Stuff Up” file is the putative class action filed on September 2, 2016 against Standard Innovation (U.S.) Corp. in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.  N.P. v. Standard Innovation (US) Corp. d/b/a We-Vibe, Case No. 1:16-cv-08655, (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 2016). According to the complaint, Standard Innovation “is a ‘sensual lifestyle products’ company that sells a high-end vibrator called the We-Vibe.”  The We-Vibe distinguishes itself from its competitors in the marketplace by its smart phone application – “We-Connect,” which can be downloaded from Apple App and Google Play stores.  Why would one care to download such an application?  According to the complaint, “With We-Connect, users can ‘pair’ their smartphone to the We-Vibe, allowing them — and their partners — remote control over the vibrator’s customizable settings and features” – bringing a whole new meaning to the phrase, “phone sex.”  For those who like to teeter on the cutting edge, this technology is referred to as “teledildonics.”  — Seriously.

The problem?  According to the complaint, “Unbeknownst to its customers . . . Defendant designed We-Connect to (i) collect and record highly intimate and sensitive data regarding consumers’ personal We-Vibe use, including the date and time of each use and the selected vibration settings, and (ii) transmit such usage data — along with the user’s personal email address—to its servers in Canada.”  While Americans may be jaded to the systematic gathering and exploitation of their personal information by internet companies for marketing purposes, this case asks the question: “Is our choice of the ‘pulse,’ ‘wave,’ ‘echo,’ ‘tide,’ ‘crest,’ ‘bounce,’ ‘surf,’ ‘peak,’ or ‘cha cha cha’ settings of our ‘sensual lifestyle products’ anybody’s business but our own (and our digital partner’s)?”

The complaint alleges causes of action for violation of the federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq.; the Illinois Eavesdropping Statute, 720 ILCS 5/14-1 et seq.; the common law tort of intrusion upon seclusion; and violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practice Act,815 ILCS 505/1 et seq.  The eavesdropping claims are premised on the allegation that “Defendant designed and programmed We-Connect to continuously and contemporaneously intercept and monitor the contents of electronic communications that customers send to their We-Vibe devices from their smartphones, such as operational instructions regarding the users’ desired vibration intensity level and desired vibration ‘mode’ or pattern.”  In other words, Standard Innovation intercepts communications between a user’s cell phone and his or her vibrator.  Plaintiff’s consumer fraud claim arises from the “connect lover” feature of We-Connect that allows “partners [to] exchange text messages, engage in video chats, and . . . control a paired We-Vibe device.”  When a device user initiates a We-Connect session, the screen encourages: “Connect and share control of your We-Vibe from anywhere.  Create a secure connection between your smartphones.”  The complaint alleges that this screen lulls the user into a false sense of security and fails to disclose Standard Innovation’s data collection practices.

The collection of personal data transmitted between devices through an application and representations regarding user privacy make this a “sexy” case – and one to watch.

The New Naturals

All Natural Litigation, Consumer Class Action, FDA, Food, , , , , , ,

** Where are Class Action Claims Against Consumer Food and Personal Product Companies Trending in 2016?**

By: Brent E. Johnson

 

PrintWe have blogged in the past about some of the “usual suspects” in the consumer class action line-up – particularly for food, beverage, cosmetics and related industries – for example, the “all-natural” case – the “evaporated cane juice” case – and the “handmade” or “craft beer” case.   Trends come and go – as Plaintiffs run out of companies to sue and as companies change their labeling and advertising in response to the litigation risks.

Which begs the question:  Where are the current litigation trends leading?  We have surveyed recent filings to identify some of the tropes and traps that plaintiffs lawyers are currently focusing on:

As we have discussed in the past, the attractiveness of the all-natural class claim lies in the gaps between FDA guidance and labeling law and the vagaries of the reasonable consumer standard.  That gap may be closing with the FDA taking comments and perhaps looking to expand its policy on “natural” foods.  As the term “Natural” loses some of its vagueness, the term “healthy” appears to be taking its place – particularly in so far as the term has the required “eye of the beholder” quality necessary to support class action claims (although in some respects the term “healthy” is regulated see e.g.,  21 CFR 101.65(d)(2)) .  For example in  Kaufman v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. 16-1199, 2016 WL 4608131, at *1 (1st Cir. Sept. 6, 2016) (reversing district court dismissal on Rule 12), CVS Pharmacy, Inc. was sued for its Vitamin E dietary supplement because its label touts the product as supporting “heart health.”  Plaintiff argues that this is misleading because the medical literature does not support a link between consuming vitamin E and cardiovascular health.  Kaufman v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. CV 14-216-ML, 2016 WL 347324, at *1 (D.R.I. Dkt. No. 1 at 7) (and in some studies cited by Plaintiff – Vitamin E dosage increases the rate of heart failure).  In Hunter v. Nature’s Way Prod., LLC, No. 16CV532-WQH-BLM, 2016 WL 4262188, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2016) (denying motion to dismiss), Plaintiff alleges that Nature’s Way’s coconut oil is advertised with various health claims (such as its “Variety of Healthy Uses”, “ideal for exercise & weight loss programs”, “fuel a[] healthy lifestyle”), but according to Plaintiff, coconut oil products are not “healthy” . . . “but rather their consumption causes increased risk of CHD, stroke, and other morbidity.” (Dkt. No. 1-5 Compl. at ¶ 118).  In Campbell v. Campbell Soup Co., No 3:16-cv-01005 (S.D. Cal. August 8, 2016) (Dkt 18) (Def. Mot. to Dismiss), Campbell’s Soup Co is defending against Plaintiff’s claims that its Healthy Request® soups are not “healthy” because they contains partially hydrogenated oil (PHO).  Notably, Campbell’s soups are somewhat unique from other food labelling cases because they contain more than 2% meat or poultry and therefore are USDA regulated (see 21 U.S.C. § 451, et seq.) and their labelling is pre-approved (see 21 U.S.C. § 457; accord 21 U.S.C. § 607).  Campbell’s has doubled-down on that argument – moving for Rule 11 sanctions.  No 3:16-cv-01005 (S.D. Cal. August 29, 2016) (Dkt 18).  In Lanovaz v. Twinings N. Am., Inc., No. 5:12-CV-02646-RMW (N.D. Cal. September 6, 2016) (dismissing remaining claims), Twinings successfully defended against claims that the labeling of its tea as a “healthy tea drinking experience” and having “antioxidant” benefits were misleading.  In particular Plaintiff claimed that Twinings’ health benefits could not be substantiated and  were contrary to FDA regulations.  No. 5:12-CV-02646-RMW (N.D. Cal. Dkt. Nos. 1, 24).  It appears that “Healthy” is the new “Natural.”

Plaintiff’s lawyers are also taking a close look at ingredients – to determine if touted anchor ingredients are prominent enough.  For example in Coe v. Gen. Mills, Inc., No. 15-CV-05112-TEH, 2016 WL 4208287, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2016) (Order denying Mot. to Dismiss), Plaintiffs argued (successfully at the pleading stage) that General Mills’ Cheerios Protein product labeling is misleading because it implies that the product is essentially the same as normal Cheerios but with added protein.  While Plaintiffs acknowledge that Cheerios Protein does have more protein than regular Cheerios (Plaintiffs calculate that 200 calories of Cheerios contains 6 grams of protein, whereas 200 grams of Cheerios Protein contains 6.4 or 6.7 grams of protein), they argue that this smidgen of an increase is so immaterial as to be misleading.  In another example, in Nazari v. Gen. Mills, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-02015 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2016), the Plaintiff sued Target with a proposed class action alleging the retailer’s up & up™ Green Aloe Vera Gel lacks traces of Aloe Vera.  Plaintiff alleges that while the product is labelled as an “aloe vera gel” with “pure aloe vera,” its laboratory testing (which it contends would have revealed acemannan, the key compound in aloe vera) could detect no active aloe ingredient.  In another example, in Torrent v. Thierry Oliver., No. 2:15-cv-02511 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2016) (denying motion to dismiss), Plaintiff survived dismissal on claims that Natierra brand Himalania Goji berries are misleadingly labeled because they are not berries from the Himalayan mountain region in China – which was inferred by the “Himalania” brand name.  In labelling, as in everything else, attention to detail counts.

We will update you on these trends as they progress.

Lawyers Don’t Always Win

Consumer Class Action, , ,

** Purported Class of Lawyers Suing for Misappropriation of Image and Likeness Fails at First Hurdle  **

By: Brent E. Johnson

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  crsfkvk5jmarrd3ls7emnw-avvo_logo-color_blue_taglineBucking the popular notion that the legal system protects its own – a recent putative class action in Illinois bought by and for a class of lawyers – failed.  Vrdolyak v. Avvo, Inc., No. 16 C 2833, 2016 WL 4765716, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2016).  The defendant in the lawsuit,  Avvo.com, publishes a directory that includes “profile pages” for millions of U.S. attorneys.   Most lawyers, however, have never asked avvo.com to create profile pages for them – let alone had any input into them (or even know they exist) – rather the machine generated profiles are created using data gleaned from public records such as bar admissions and court records.  The generated “profile page” contains identifying information and a rating calculated by an algorithm (which, rather crudely, primarily uses the number of years in practice as its measure).  But some lawyers purchase from avvo.com special “sponsored listings” which promote their avvo.com profile above the unwashed mass.  It appears that avvo.com’s business model relies on its critical mass of (involuntary) profiles and the ability to allow lawyers willing to pay a fee, to appear more prominently (i.e. what Google does!).  Plaintiff John Vrdolyak (a University of Chicago law school graduate) cried foul.  He claimed that his identity (and that of every other involuntarily avvo.com profiled lawyer) was misappropriated for commercial purposes without consent in violation of the Illinois Right of Publicity Act (“IRPA”), 765 ILCS 1075/1 et seq.

The Court sided with avvo.com – agreeing with its argument that the profile pages were speech that is fully protected by the First Amendment.  The court reasoned that what avvo.com does is akin to a yellow pages directory, which receives First Amendment protection.  Dex Media West, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 696 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding that publications like yellow pages directories and newspapers receive full First Amendment protection because, as a threshold matter, they do not constitute commercial speech.)  The Court also analogized the avvo.com profiles to those of a magazine, like Sports Illustrated, that publishes non-commercial information (i.e. articles about athletes) and sells and places advertisements within and around that information.  The articles are fully protected non-commercial speech – the advertisements are (less protected) commercial speech.  In this case the “Sponsored Listings” were the commercial speech – but they were authorized and not at issue.  Those profiles that were at issue – the unauthorized profiles – were protected speech and their placement with the sponsored listing did not convert the entire website into commercial speech – the court opined.  Gallingly, the court not only refused to side with the lawyers – but used the Constitution to do so.